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DEFINING THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT’S 
“SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED” TRIBAL COURT JUDGE 
 
Jill Elizabeth Tompkins 
 
Modern tribal courts are faced with the difficult proposition of 
resolving increasingly complex disputes in a manner that is both 
loyal to tradition, and responsive to Anglo notions of due process. 
Tribal courts . . . are in a unique position to rediscover tribal 
customs and traditions as a manner of resolving disputes and 
reintegrating those values into modern Indian life. The resolution 
of a dispute in tribal court, however, must always be administered 
with a dose of Anglo due process . . . .1 
Honorable B.J. Jones 
Chief Justice, Turtle Mountain Court of Appeals 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tribal justice systems are one of the most visible 
manifestations of the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Diminution of 
tribal court criminal jurisdiction by the U.S. Supreme Court is the 
trend that has most undermined American Indian and Alaska 
                                                                                                             
 President, Board of Directors, National American Indian Court Judges 
Association (NAICJA); Past Director and Clinical Professor of Law, University 
of Colorado School of Law American Indian Law Clinic. Thank you to the 
NAICJA Board of Directors and Steering Committee, especially the Honorable 
Carrie Garrow, Mark Pouley, and Joseph Wiseman, for their invaluable insights 
and support in the writing of this article. Special appreciation is given to 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court judicial law clerk Latanya Gabaldon for her 
editorial assistance. 
1 B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging 
Issues in Tribal-state and Tribal-federal Court Relations, 457 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 457, 475 (1998). 
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Native tribes’ ability to protect their citizens and communities. In 
1968, with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),2 
tribal courts were divested of authority to hand down felony 
sentences, essentially stripping the tribes of meaningful jurisdiction 
over serious offenders. With the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, tribal courts were deemed to lack 
jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with committing criminal 
offenses within tribal lands.3 Fortunately, in recent years, Congress 
has been more attentive to the alarms raised by tribal leaders 
regarding the rates and nature of the violent crimes occurring in 
Indian Country by Indians and non-Indians alike, and has taken 
action to restore a limited amount of tribal court jurisdiction and 
sentencing authority. 
The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA) is one example 
of Congress’ response 4 . It amended the ICRA to allow tribal 
courts to sentence offenders up to three years for any one offense 
and up to nine years in any single proceeding.5 However, this new 
sentencing authority came with certain strings attached—
ostensibly put into place to ensure that defendants charged in tribal 
court receive due process. With the enactment of the Violence 
Against Women Act Reauthorization of 2013 (VAWA), Title IX, 
“Safety For Indian Women,”6 Congress took additional steps to 
address violence in Indian County. These steps especially focused 
on the epidemic of sexual and domestic violence committed by 
non-Indians against American Indian women. VAWA 2013 
restores to tribes the ability to prosecute non-Indians who commit 
crimes of sexual and domestic violence in Indian Country. This 
restored jurisdiction is referred to in VAWA 2013 as “Special 
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” (SDVCJ). Pursuant to 
VAWA 2013, for the first time since the Oliphant decision, tribes 
will again be able to prosecute non-Indians, but for only three 
categories of crime: domestic violence, dating violence, and 
                                                                                                             
2 Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 and 25 U.S.C.). 
3 Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (concluding that 
Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians). 
4 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258. 
5 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (a)(7)(B), (C), (D) (2010). 
6 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 
1101(a), 127 Stat. 134 (2013).  
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violations of protection orders. 7  Certain prerequisites must be 
satisfied in order for the tribal court to exercise this jurisdiction: 1) 
one of the parties in the case must be Indian; and 2) the defendant 
must have sufficient ties to the Indian community through 
residence, employment, or a relationship with a tribal member, or 
Indian resident.8 If tribes wish to exercise the expanded SDVCJ 
however, the TLOA’s Due Process requirements attach. In order to 
restore tribal criminal authority, Congress adopted a compromise 
that would allay non-Indian concerns regarding the fairness of 
tribal court proceedings balanced against the tribes’ competing 
desire to preserve the cultural integrity of their justice systems. 
This Article explores the meaning of ICRA’s new provisions 
which require tribes choosing to exercise jurisdiction in criminal 
matters with either TLOA’s enhanced sentencing authority or 
VAWA’s SDVCJ to utilize judges that are “licensed by any 
jurisdiction in the United States” 9  and have “sufficient legal 
training to preside over criminal trials.” 10  Part I discusses the 
historical criticism levied against tribal courts which gave rise to 
the imposition of ICRA’s tribal judicial qualifications as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite. Next, Part II explores the tension tribal 
courts experience as they seek to operate systems committed to 
traditional cultural values, which will be able to withstand federal 
court scrutiny. Finally, Part III offers recommendations for tribes 
to help them satisfy ICRA’s judicial qualification requirements. 
Although Congress has mandated tribal judicial qualifications as a 
precursor to the exercise of SDVCJ and the imposition of TLOA’s 
enhanced sentencing authority, it allowed significant leeway for 
tribal courts to develop their own approaches to satisfying the 
requirements. 
 
I. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS ABOUT TRIBAL COURTS 
“Why Would Anyone Oppose the Violence Against Women 
Act?” is the question Molly Ball, a reporter for The Atlantic, set 
out to answer after 22 Republican senators voted against 
                                                                                                             
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)(B). 
10 Id. § 1302(c)(3)(A). 
 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:53 
 
 
56 
reauthorizing VAWA in February 2013. 11  Among the reasons 
these dissenters took such a “politically risky stand” was their 
opposition to the provision that would give tribal governments 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on 
reservations.12 These critics “say tribal courts are under resourced 
and have a history of failing to provide legal protections to 
defendants.”13  
The chronic inadequacy of tribal court funding has been known 
for decades.14 For example, in 1942, the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, while noting the phenomenal progress of tribal courts, 
identified underfunding as a lingering problem: “[t]he lack of 
adequate appropriations for the support of courts and for the 
maintenance of an adequate police force have handicapped the 
administration of justice.”15 About a half-century later, the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights examined enforcement of the ICRA 
starting in 1986 and issued its report in 1991. One of the 
Commission’s key findings at that time was that “[t]he failure of 
the United States Government to provide proper funding for the 
operation of tribal judicial systems, particularly in light of the 
imposed requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, has 
continued for more than 20 years.” 16  This is still the case, as 
evidenced by the recent Government Accounting Office survey of 
tribes. In 2012, the GAO conducted a survey of 171 tribes 
regarding their plans to implement TLOA’s new sentencing 
authority.17 109 of 171 tribes responded, and none of the 109 tribes 
                                                                                                             
11 Molly Ball, Why Would Anyone Oppose the Violence Against Women Act?, 
THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 12, 2013, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/why-would-anyone-
oppose-the-violence-against-women-act/273103/. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Robyn Shapiro, Report to the House of Delegates, 117A A.B.A. SEC. 
INDIVIDUAL RTS. AND RESPONSIBILITIES REP. 4, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/jd/tribalcourts/pdf/OneH
undredSeventeenA.authcheckdam.pdf. 
15 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A REPORT OF 
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 41 (1991) (citing JOHN 
COLLIER, 1941 REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS). 
16 Id. at 72. 
17 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-658R,  
TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT: NONE OF THE SURVEYED TRIBES REPORTED 
EXERCISING THE NEW SENTENCING AUTHORITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
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were exercising TLOA’s enhanced sentencing authority at the 
time.18 When asked to describe challenges to exercising the new 
jurisdiction, 96 percent of the responding tribes cited lack of 
funding as the most common barrier.19 Additionally, several tribes 
reported specific challenges with the cost of hiring a licensed, law-
trained judge.20  
Unfortunately, a national picture of tribal court funding 
situations does not exist. Tribal justice systems can be funded 
through the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs funds, Department of 
Justice grants, and/or tribal sources, including proceeds from 
Indian gaming and other tribal economic ventures. The 
forthcoming Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014 National Tribal 
Court Survey21 will hopefully go a long way to finally providing 
information about tribal court funding trends and documenting 
their unmet need. It is anticipated that the survey will reveal that 
the root reason tribes are hesitant to exercise the expanded 
sentencing authority under TLOA and the new SDVCJ jurisdiction 
under VAWA is lack of funding for tribal court operations and 
detention facilities. 
Fierce criticism of tribal courts is not a recent phenomenon. 
Often the critic will paint all tribal justice systems with the same 
broad brush based on a single questionable ruling or practice of a 
single tribal court. Tribal courts have been scrutinized by members 
of Congress and by the federal courts. For example, in his dissent 
in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Red Wolf, Circuit Judge Kleinfeld 
detailed at length the numerous due process defects he perceived in 
a wrongful death jury trial conducted by the Crow Tribal Court.22 
                                                                                                             
JUSTICE COULD CLARIFY TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY OF CERTAIN GRANT FUNDS 2 
(2012), available at http://gao.gov/assets/600/591213.pdf. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 8. 
20 Id. 
21 Kauffman & Associates, Inc., 2014 National Tribal Court Survey of Tribal 
Court Systems, http://www.tribalcourtsurvey.org/survey/. 
22 Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1997), 
(citing due process violations including the impaneling of a jury where a 
majority of the jurors were related to the decedents, improper prejudicial 
comments by a tribal appellate court judge to the jury venire prior to being 
impanelled, the use of evidence that would have been barred under federal rules, 
and the barring of evidence relating to the proper amount of compensatory 
damages.), vacated Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf, 522 U.S. 
801 (1997).  
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At about the same time, Congressman Henry Hyde, in 1996, spoke 
on the floor of the House of Representatives repeating Judge 
Kleinfeld’s Due Process complaints about the Crow trial 
proceedings.23 His closing remarks foreshadowed the imposition of 
the due process requirements mandated in TLOA and VAWA:  
 
I do want to stress that I believe in the Indian tribal 
court system. It is only right that Indians should be 
able to have their own courts to judge their own 
affairs. By the same token, I want to say 
emphatically that it is only right that those courts 
should provide all of the constitutional protections 
required by law, including basic due process. The 
consistent enforcement of constitutional norms is 
particularly important if the tribal courts are to have 
jurisdiction over nonmembers who have only 
tangential relationships with the tribes.24 
 
More recently, Senators Jon Kyl, Orrin Hatch, and Tom 
Coburn wrote a “Minority View” report objecting to the provision 
of VAWA 2013 that establishes tribal criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian offenders. 25  Their criticism was only supported by 
anecdotes regarding a few isolated tribal court systems.26 Among 
their complaints was the criticism that tribal courts are “racially-
exclusive”27—without, of course, acknowledging that it was the 
U.S. Supreme Court that created the situation with its Oliphant 
decision. 
 In Oliphant, Chief Justice Rehnquist approvingly cites the 
reasoning of Ex parte Crow Dog.28 In Ex parte Crow Dog, the 
Court confronted the issue of whether, prior to the passage of the 
Major Crimes Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to try Indians 
who had offended against fellow Indians on reservation land.29 In 
concluding that criminal jurisdiction was exclusively in the tribe, 
                                                                                                             
23 142 CONG. REC. E1704 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Henry J. 
Hyde), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/1996/9/26/daily-digest. 
24 Id. 
25 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 48–56 (2011). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (citing Ex parte 
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)). 
29 Id. at 210. 
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the Crow Dog court found “particular guidance in the ‘nature and 
circumstances of the case.’”30 
 
The United States was seeking to extend United 
States “law, by argument and inference only, . . . 
over aliens and strangers; over the members of a 
community separated by race [and] tradition, . . . 
from the authority and power which seeks to impose 
upon them the restraints of an external and 
unknown code . . . ; which judges them by a 
standard made by others and not for them. . . . It 
tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of 
their people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a 
different race, according to the law of a social state 
of which they have an imperfect conception . . . .”31 
 
Applying this reasoning to the inverse situation concerning a 
non-Indian offender, the Oliphant court declined to adopt the 
position that tribes retain the power to try non-Indians according to 
their own customs and procedures.32 Rather, the Court held that 
tribes did not have inherent jurisdiction to try and punish non-
Indian offenders.33  
Senators Kyl, Hatch, and Coburn cite an Indian newspaper 
publisher, who without documentary support, asserted that, “[i]n 
most tribal constitutions there is no separation of powers.” 34 
Professor Frank Pommersheim articulated the importance of 
separation of powers for the legitimacy of tribal courts: 
“majoritarian politics . . . cannot achieve legitimacy for all 
segments of society or tribe. The legal system . . . ha[s] often been 
able to establish the rights of individuals or groups to be treated 
fairly under the law.”35 In order for a tribal court to protect the 
rights of individuals it needs to be able to operate without political 
interference from other tribal governmental branches. What these 
critics fail to acknowledge, however, is that with the passage of the 
                                                                                                             
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 210–11. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 212. 
34 S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 49 (2011). 
35 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 72–73 (1995). 
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Indian Reorganization Act of 193436  tribes were encouraged to 
adopt cookie-cutter constitutions that did not provide for 
independent tribal judiciaries. A review of more recently adopted 
or revised tribal constitutions, however, reveals an emerging trend 
towards the establishment of constitutionally separate tribal 
courts.37  
Although VAWA 2013’s tribal court jurisdictional provisions 
are directed solely to criminal prosecutions, these opposing 
Senators took the opportunity to rail against the principle of tribal 
sovereign immunity and leaped to the following conclusion: “[t]his 
lack of civil-rights guarantees and avenues for their meaningful 
enforcement has resulted in tribal criminal-justice systems that fail 
to provide Due Process.”38 Finally, they proffered a solution to the 
lack of prosecution of non-Indian offenders on Indian reservations: 
 
[A]n obvious solution to the problem of gaps in 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
reservations in cases where the United States 
declines to prosecute an offense committed on a 
reservation by a non-Indian, [is that] state 
authorities should be allowed to do so, regardless of 
the race of the victim . . . . [T]he notion of sovereign 
“tribal territory” that is immune from the reach of 
state law is more legal fiction than government 
reality . . . . There is no good reason to not give 
states and their local governments jurisdiction to 
prosecute offenses committed by non-Indians 
within Indian reservations.39 
 
These Senators are unaware that their idea is far from novel. 
Public Law 280 (PL 280), passed during the “Termination Era”—
                                                                                                             
36 25 U.S.C.A §§ 461–494 (west 2015). 
37 JOSEPH THOMAS FLIES-AWAY, CARRIE GARROW, & MIRIAM JORGENSEN, 
NATIVE NATION COURTS: KEY PLAYERS IN NATION REBUILDING, IN REBUILDING 
NATIVE NATIONS, STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 377–78 
(2nd ed. 2010) (“If the nation does not have a constitutional separation of 
powers or a set of institutions or processes that promote independent dispute 
resolution outside of the written constitution, it probably ought to pursue judicial 
independence through constitutional reform . . . . In the past few years, more 
tribal nations are engaging in constitutional reform activities, which often 
include discussion and popular vote on separation of powers.”). 
38 Id. at 50.  
39 Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
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between 1953 and 1968—, extended state criminal jurisdiction to 
Indian County in several states.40 Steven Pevar, author and Senior 
Staff Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, offers that 
one major reason for the high rate of crime in Indian Country is 
that many of the officials responsible for prosecuting reservation 
crime—federal officials in non-PL 280 states and state officials in 
PL 280 states—“have largely abdicated those responsibilities. In 
PL 280 states, the counties in which Indian reservations are located 
are often reluctant to spend their limited tax dollars on fighting 
reservation crime.”41 Consequently, the extension of state criminal 
jurisdiction to offenses committed by non-Indians within Indian 
reservations, via a PL 280 type fix, not only flies in the face of the 
principle of tribal sovereignty, but has already proven to be 
dangerously ineffective. 
Certainly, there are some tribal courts that have employed 
methods that do not comport with general American notions of 
Due Process. A wider review of tribal court systems, however, 
reveals a major following of tribal constitutions and laws that 
incorporate at a minimum the requirements of the ICRA. 42 
Moreover, many tribes have adopted constitutions that guarantee 
most, if not all, of the protections enjoyed under the U.S. 
Constitution. 43  Regardless of the current state of tribal 
constitutions, tribes that wish to exercise the expanded jurisdiction 
under TLOA and VAWA, must, nonetheless, satisfy the new 
requirements of Due Process as articulated in those statutes. 
 
II. THE TRIBAL JUDGE REQUIREMENTS 
When a tribe seeks to exercise the expanded jurisdiction and 
enhanced sentencing authority of TLOA or VAWA 2013’s 
SDVCJ, and the defendant is subject to the possibility of 
imprisonment, the tribe must provide the following enumerated 
Due Process protections: 1) effective assistance of counsel equal to 
                                                                                                             
40 Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended in scatted sections of 
18 U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C §1360). 
41 STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 131 (4th ed. 2012). 
42 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meaning of 
Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 557 (2000). 
43 Id. at 590 (“[C]ertain tribes [have] adopted a separation of powers ideology, 
either de jure or de facto, and their courts have exercised the power of judicial 
review.”). 
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at least that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution; 2) in the case of a 
indigent defendant, a defense attorney licensed to practice by any 
jurisdiction in the United States, provided, at the tribal 
government’s expense; 3) an assurance that the defense attorney is 
licensed by a jurisdiction that applies appropriate licensing 
standards and effectively ensures the competence and professional 
responsibility of its licensed attorneys; 4) that judges presiding 
over criminal proceedings subject to enhanced sentencing or 
concerning a non-Indian defendant have “sufficient legal training 
to preside over criminal trials;” and 5) that any judge presiding 
over criminal proceedings subject to enhanced sentencing or 
concerning a non-Indian defendant is licensed to practice law by 
any jurisdiction in the United States.44  
In contrast to these Congressional efforts to “Westernize” tribal 
courts, in the last twenty-years or so, many American Indian and 
Alaska Native tribes have begun questioning and reevaluating their 
existing tribal courts. Tribal courts are seen as the product of 
“historical suppression,”45—ill-fitting and ineffective at addressing 
individual and community problems—and many tribes are 
reclaiming their traditional dispute resolution practices. Many 
tribes are deliberately including the use of tribal elders, 
peacemakers, and lay judges in their justice systems. These are the 
individuals who have deep knowledge of indigenous justice 
principles and are usually highly respected by the tribal 
community. While seeking to implement indigenous approaches, 
grounded in cultural values, traditions and custom, tribal courts are 
grappling with an increasing number of complex cases involving a 
multiplication of social woes and dangers. Additionally, tribal 
courts need to be cognizant that their decisions will be scrutinized 
and judged by outside jurisdictions and face the prospects of not 
being enforced, especially if those decisions do not comport with 
federal notions of Due Process. 
Professor of Law and Chief Justice of the Turtle Mountain 
Court of Appeals B.J. Jones described the reconciliation process 
that is happening in tribal justice systems: 
 
                                                                                                             
44 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c), 1304(d). 
45 Jones, supra note 1, at 475. 
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Modern tribal courts are faced with the difficult 
proposition of resolving increasingly complex 
disputes in a manner that is both loyal to tradition, 
and responsive to Anglo notions of due process. 
Tribal courts . . . are in a unique position to 
rediscover tribal customs and traditions as a manner 
of resolving disputes and reintegrating those values 
into modern Indian life. The resolution of a dispute 
in tribal court, however, must always be 
administered with a dose of Anglo due process 
because of the need to have tribal judgments 
respected by outside court systems.46 
 
Since its enactment in 1968, ICRA has provided a means for a 
detained criminal defendant to seek a writ of habeas corpus from a 
federal district court for alleged ICRA violations.47 A very small 
percentage of all tribal criminal court cases are challenged in 
federal court under ICRA.48 In 2013, Professor and Judge Carrie 
Garrow conducted an unprecedented survey of habeas corpus 
petitions filed in federal court under ICRA since 1968.49 Over the 
course of forty-five years, only thirty cases were filed.50 When the 
detainee is an Indian, the federal courts have been respectful of 
tribal sovereignty and tribal court jurisdiction. 51  Fifteen of the 
thirty petitions were dismissed for failure to exhaust tribal court 
remedies. 52  However, when a tribal government detains a non-
                                                                                                             
46 Id. 
47 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2015) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any 
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by 
order of an Indian tribe.”). 
48 Carrie E. Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions In Federal And Tribal Courts: A 
Search For Individualized Justice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 137 (Oct. 
2015). Carrie Garrow is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Syracuse University 
and the Chief Appellate Judge for the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Court. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 9. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.; accord Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Requiring 
exhaustion of tribal remedies not only fosters mutual respect between sovereigns 
in a manner similar to abstention in favor of state courts . . . but also promotes 
tribal self-government through the development of the tribal court system . . . . 
.Thus the tribal exhaustion doctrine implicates unique and ‘exceptional’ 
concerns beyond those implicated in federal-state comity cases . . . . Not only 
does adjudicating ICRA claims in federal court necessarily constitute an 
interference with tribal autonomy and self-government . . . but resolution of 
statutory issues under ICRA will ‘frequently depend on questions of tribal 
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Indian, the federal courts have found that exhaustion of tribal 
remedies is not required.53 Five of the thirty cases involved non-
Indian defendants.54 As a result of the Oliphant decision, it is rare 
for non-Indians to be detained by tribal governments. Of the thirty 
habeas corpus cases reviewed by Professor Garrow, only four 
writs were granted.55  
Congress has not articulated a standard of review for federal 
courts assessing tribal court convictions for alleged violations of 
ICRA in habeas corpus proceedings.56 In a recent article presented 
to the California Tribal-State Judicial Forum, Judge Joseph J. 
Wiseman57 and attorney Jacquelyn Larson explored what standard 
of review federal courts should employ.58 Since ICRA’s enactment 
in 1968, federal courts have adopted a de novo standard of review 
and have applied federal constitutional case law in their analysis.59  
When a federal court reviews a state court decision in the 
habeas context, the highly deferential standard of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is applied.60 
Under this standard of review, federal review of a state court 
decision “shall not” be granted unless the state court’s factual 
determination was “unreasonable” or if the state proceedings 
resulted in a decision that involved an “unreasonable” application 
of “clearly established” federal law as determined by the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate 
than federal courts.”). 
53 Garrow, supra note 51, at 9. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2015). 
57 Chief Judge, Northern California Intertribal Court; Chief Justice, Court of 
Appeals, Round Valley Indian Tribes. 
58 Joseph J. Wiseman, There and Back Again (Almost), A.B.A, Aug. 12, 2013, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/civil/articles/081213-there-
back-again-indian-country-almost.html.  
59 Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The construction 
or interpretation of a statute [such as ICRA] is a question of law . . . reviewed de 
novo.”); see also Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 977–79 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(construing allegations of violations of ICRA utilizing a de novo standard with 
no legal support except for one U.S. Supreme Court case); United States v. 
Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (non-habeas proceeding 
finding that ICRA imposes an “identical limitation” on tribal government action 
as the Fourth Amendment and utilizing predominantly Ninth Circuit precedent 
reasoning that the federal standard “nets the same result as an analysis under 
ICRA”). 
6028 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996). 
2015] Defining the Indian Civil Rights Act 65 
 
 
Court.61 Wiseman and Larson concur with Garrow’s finding that 
the vast majority of habeas petitions for alleged violations of 
ICRA are dismissed because the petitioner has not exhausted all 
tribal remedies.62 Habeas review is repeatedly denied by federal 
courts because the “policy of nurturing tribal self-government 
strongly discourages federal courts from assuming jurisdiction 
over unexhausted claims.”63 Wiseman and Larson posit: 
 
Yet, despite this policy [of nurturing tribal self-
government] once a tribe has exhausted its power, 
the tribe’s definitions of such important ideals as 
due process and equal protection will be enforced 
identically to the definitions already in place by the 
federal court circuit encompassing that tribe. If, 
instead, Congress put in a deferential standard 
similar to the AEDPA, setting Supreme Court cases 
as the base standard, this would allow a tribe the 
ability to define its own rules without putting in 
place lower level federal definitions, and would 
actually encourage tribal self-government.64 
 
As tribal courts begin to exercise jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(c) and § 1304, where tribal court defendants are being 
provided with the services of licensed defense attorneys, it is 
highly likely that the number of petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus filed in federal court will increase significantly in the near 
future. For this reason, tribal court judges must be even more 
cognizant of the increased likelihood of outside federal review of 
their criminal proceedings.  
 
A. The Licensed Tribal Judge 
Let’s take a closer look at the requirements TLOA and VAWA 
2013 mandate for tribal judges who are responsible for exercising 
the enhanced sentencing authority. These judicial qualification 
requirements are found in each law under the heading “Rights of 
                                                                                                             
61 Wiseman, supra note 63 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996)). 
62 Id. (citing Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010); Alvarez v. 
Tracey 773 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
63 Jeffredo, 599 F.3d. 
64 Wiseman, supra note 63, at 5. 
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Defendants.”65 The presiding tribal court judge must be licensed to 
practice law and have “sufficient legal training to preside over 
criminal proceedings.” 66  In the course of the Government 
Accounting Office 2012 study on the implementation of TLOA, 
one tribe reported that it maintained a very effective civil and 
criminal justice system for the past forty years in spite of never 
having or requiring a law-trained judge to preside over the court.67 
When considering the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009, the 
Committee on Indian Affairs received comments that tribal court 
judges should be required to graduate from an accredited law 
school and be licensed by a state supreme court. 68  Noting that 
several states do not require judges to graduate from an accredited 
law school, the Committee declined to recommend such 
qualifications.69 The Committee did provide some guidance as to 
the licensing requirements: 
 
The intent of the section 304 licensing requirements 
for public defenders and tribal court judges respects 
the dual purposes of the Indian Civil Rights Act to 
protect the rights of individuals before tribal courts, 
and to acknowledge and strengthen tribal self-
government. Section 304 requires tribal 
governments that enact criminal laws subjecting 
offenders to more than one year imprisonment for 
any one offense to also require attorneys and judges 
presiding over such criminal trials to meet certain 
licensing standards. Whether the standard employed 
is a state, federal or tribal standard will be a 
decision for the tribal government. Several tribal 
governments have developed their own tribal law 
standards and others have adopted state licensing 
standards.70 
 
As a result of the Committee’s guidance, Congress mandated 
that the presiding tribal court judge be “licensed to practice by any 
                                                                                                             
65 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c), 1304(d). 
66 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c)(3), 1304(d)(1). 
67 U.S. GOV’T Accounting Office, supra note 18, at 8. 
68 S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 17 n.57 (2009). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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jurisdiction in the United States.”71 Given the Senate Committee 
report’s language it is fairly clear that so long as the tribal judge 
meets the tribe’s licensing standard then one of the qualification 
prongs is met.72 
 
B. The Sufficiently Trained Judge 
The requirement that the tribal court judge have “sufficient 
legal training to preside over criminal proceedings”73 is much more 
ambiguous. One scholar has astutely noted that: 
 
[S]uch an undefined standard subjects tribal judges 
to having their qualifications scrutinized by federal 
district court judges in habeas proceedings. Federal 
judges will often be unfamiliar with the culturally 
specific-values informing the tribal government’s 
choice to use elders or lay judges. And as 
professional lawyers trained in the modern 
American system, federal judges may recoil from 
the idea that nonlawyers could justly adjudicate 
criminal cases. Thus in striving for flexibility, 
Congress may have inadvertently opened the door 
to inflexible federal court interpretations.74 
 
The SDVCJ became effective for all tribes on March 7, 2015—
a whole two years after VAWA 2013’s enactment. Congress did 
however establish a Pilot Project under which certain tribes could 
apply to exercise SDVCJ prior to the effective date. 75  The 
Department of Justice undertook widespread tribal consultation 
that included opportunities for tribal judges to weigh in on how the 
                                                                                                             
71 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)(B) (2010). 
72 Cf. Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11001979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 28, 2012) (remanding for a new trial that comports with the 
requirements of TLOA, where the original presiding judge was not licensed to 
practice law by any jurisdiction of the United States). 
73 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(3)(A) (2010). 
74 Seth Fortin, Comment, The Two-Tiered Program of the Tribal Law and Order 
Act, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 88, 106 (2013). 
75 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113-4, § 
1101(a), 127 Stat. 134 (2013). In Section 908(a)(2): “[T]he Attorney General 
may grant a request under subparagraph (A) after coordinating with the 
Secretary of the Interior, consulting with affected Indian tribes, and concluding 
that the criminal justice system of the requesting tribe has adequate safeguards 
in place to protect defendants’ rights . . . .” Id. 
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Department should evaluate a tribe’s eligibility to participate in the 
Pilot Project. In May 2013, the Justice Department circulated a 
“framing paper” seeking input on a variety of questions.76 One 
question posed was:  
 
In criminal proceedings in which the tribe exercises 
SDVCJ and a term of imprisonment of any length is 
or may be imposed, the new statute requires that the 
judge presiding over the criminal proceeding both is 
licensed to practice law and has sufficient legal 
training to preside over criminal proceedings. How 
should the Justice Department evaluate whether a 
judge’s legal training is sufficient to preside over 
criminal proceedings?  
 
The National American Indian Court Judges Association gave the 
following response: 
 
This is a difficult standard to articulate. No such 
evaluation is necessary for many county and state 
court judges—some of whom may not be law 
school graduates or attorneys. . . . [I]n state courts 
of general jurisdiction, a judge whose law practice 
prior to taking the bench focused on non-criminal 
matters, will be expected to expeditiously undertake 
self-study to become competent to hear criminal 
matters. . . . A certification by a nationally respected 
tribal judicial education organization awarded to a 
tribal judge after completing a course of classroom 
and experiential study, could be developed that 
could serve as prima facia [sic] evidence of 
sufficient legal training. In lieu of that, the 
Department should use a flexible tribal self-
certification approach in which the tribe articulates 
what legal education and experience the judge who 
                                                                                                             
76 OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE VAWA PILOT PROJECT ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION ( 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/appl-
questionnaire-vawa-pilot.pdf.  
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will be exercising the SDVCJ jurisdiction 
possesses.77 
 
The Department of Justice granted the requests of three tribes 
to exercise SDVCJ: the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation in Oregon, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, and the 
Tulalip Tribes of Washington.78 It may be instructive to see how 
each of the successful applicant tribes answered the Department’s 
question as to how the tribe would safeguard a defendant’s right to 
a trained, licensed judge.79 If the Department of Justice found the 
applicants’ judges qualified, then that assessment may give some 
guidance to non-Pilot Project tribes.  
To support their assertion of qualified judges, the Umatilla 
Tribes cited: the Umatilla Criminal Code section 3.28(D), which 
mirrors the language of 25 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(3); the Umatilla Court 
Code section 2.02(D) which requires, “[a]ny judge presiding over a 
criminal trial [to] be a member in good standing of any state bar 
and a graduate of an accredited law school”; and Chapter 4 of the 
Court Code, which sets out rules of judicial conduct “similar to 
those governing state and federal judges.”80 The Umatilla’s current 
judges, William Johnson and David Gallaher (pro tempore) are 
both law school graduates, members of the Oregon bar, and have 
                                                                                                             
77 Letter from Justice Jill E. Tompkins, President, Bd. of Directors, Nat’l Am. 
Indian Court Judges Ass’n to Deputy Att’y Gen. Sam Hirsch, Re: Consultation 
on Pilot Project, VAWA §§ 904 & 908 (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.tribal-
institute.org/download/Drug%2520Court/NAICJA%2520comments%2520re%2
520Pilot%2520Project.docx&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwiE8OiwrN_JAhVK-
2MKHYzcDVIQFggFMAA&client=internal-uds-
cse&usg=AFQjCNHLjwoL2nnRGgwDCxseYf0yr-OR8g. 
78 Three Tribes to Exercise Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Perpetrators Under 
VAWA, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/02/06/three-tribes-exercise-
jurisdiction-over-non-indian-perpetrators-under-vawa-153444. 
79 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VAWA 2013 PILOT PROJECT, 
HTTP://WWW.JUSTICE.GOV/TRIBAL/VAWA-2013-PILOT-PROJECT.  
80 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE 
UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION FOR PERMISSION TO EXERCISE SDVCJ 
AUTHORITY PRIOR TO MARCH OF 2015, 5 (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/appl-
questionnaire-vawa.pdf. 
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years of experience either adjudicating or prosecuting criminal 
cases in tribal or state court.81  
Like the Umatilla Tribes, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe answered the 
question regarding the provision of a licensed, law trained judge by 
reference to 3 PYTC section 2-2-313 which also mirrors the 
language of 25 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(3).82 The only tribal judge listed 
by the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in its application was Judge Mel Stoof, 
who is admitted to practice in the State of Texas, several U.S. 
District Courts, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, and several tribal 
courts in the Southwest United States.83  
The Tulalip Tribes have taken a particularly thoughtful 
approach to preparing themselves to undertake the jurisdiction 
established under TLOA and VAWA 2013. Tulalip Tribal Code 
Chapter 2.05 Tribal Court, section 2.05.040 sets forth the 
qualifications of Tulalip tribal court judges generally: 
 
(1) Eligibility. To be eligible to serve as a Judge of 
the Tribal Court, a person must: 
 
(a) Be over 25 years of age; 
 
(b) Never have been convicted or found guilty 
of a felony in any Federal or State Court or of a 
Class E offense under Tulalip Tribal law; 
 
(c) Within the previous five years, not have 
been convicted of a misdemeanor in any Tribal, 
Federal, or State Court; 
 
(d) Be of high moral character and never have 
been convicted of any offense involving moral 
turpitude; 
(e) Be either a Judge from any Federally 
recognized Indian tribe, licensed to practice 
before the Washington State Bar Association, or 
any other qualified person appointed by the 
                                                                                                             
81 Id. 
82 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF THE PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE VAWA 
PILOT PROJECT QUESTIONNAIRE ON TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, (Dec. 30, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2014/02/06/appl-
questionnaire-pascua-yaqui.pdf. 
83 Id. 
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Tribal Board of Directors, or possess a J.D. 
from an accredited law school; and 
 
(f) Be a member in good standing of the Tulalip 
Bar.84  
 
Section 6 of the Tulalip Code explicitly sets forth the 
qualifications of Tulalip judges who are authorized to preside over 
felony crimes: “To be eligible to preside over all stages of a felony 
criminal case, the Judge must: (a) have sufficient legal training to 
preside over criminal proceedings; and (b) be licensed as an 
attorney in the State of Washington or other state.”85 In support of 
its assertion that the Tulalip Tribes has in place judges meeting the 
qualifications of Section 6 and 25 U.S.C. § 1303(c)(3), the Tulalip 
Tribes provided a link to a page on the tribal website where the 
biography of the current tribal court judge, Chief Judge Ronald J. 
Whitener, is posted.86In addition, the Tulalip Tribes included with 
their application a copy of the Tulalip Tribes Domestic Violence 
Court Rules. Rule 6.41(H)(ix) establishes the procedure by which 
judges who are found to meet the qualifications to preside in the 
Special Domestic Violence Court are chosen: “The Chief Judge 
shall designate and assign Judges to the Special Domestic Violence 
Court every January by standing order and the standing order and 
qualifications of the Judge will become part of the trial record.” 
Although all three applicant tribes statutorily mandate that the 
tribal judges presiding over criminal cases possess TLOA and 
SDVCJ’s judicial requirements, they did not elaborate on what 
“sufficient legal training” the current judges underwent to preside 
over criminal proceedings. It is doubtful that a reviewing federal 
court in a habeas proceeding would be satisfied with such a 
cursory demonstration of the training undertaken to preside over 
criminal court proceedings. Thus, it is imperative that tribal court 
                                                                                                             
84 TULALIP TRIBAL CODES § 2.05.040 (2015), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Tulalip/html/Tulalip02/Tulalip0205.html#
2.05.040. 
85 Id. § 2.05.040(6). 
86 Chief Judge Ronald J. Whitener,TULALIP TRIBAL COURT,  
http://www.tulaliptribes-
nsn.gov/Home/Government/Departments/TribalCourt/JudgesDirectorBio.aspx. 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2015). 
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criminal judges make specific findings in court record with regard 
to both their licensure and their training. 
It may be helpful to look at another situation in which the 
qualifications of a legal professional, over and above licensure and 
bar admission, are scrutinized. In order to serve as counsel in a 
class action, an attorney must file a motion for appointment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g). In appointing class counsel, 
the court: 
(A) must consider: 
 
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or 
investigating potential claims in the action; 
 
(ii) counsel's experience in handling class 
actions, other complex litigation, and the types 
of claims asserted in the action; 
 
(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; 
and 
 
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to 
representing the class; 
 
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to 
counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class . . . .87 
 
There is no requirement that potential class counsel 
demonstrate that he or she has undergone specific legal training in 
the handling of class actions. Rather, the movant’s actual 
experience in handling class actions and knowledge of the 
governing law is the relevant consideration. In similar fashion, 
when seeking to demonstrate that a tribal court judge has sufficient 
training, providing a record of the number of prior criminal matters 
that the judge has handled may be critical to overcome a habeas 
challenge to a tribal court conviction based upon an inadequately 
trained judge. 
The U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in its report, 
which became VAWA 2013, explained that section 904, 
                                                                                                             
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). 
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acknowledging inherent power of tribes to exercise SDVCJ, 
“builds on the groundwork laid by Congress in passing the Tribal 
Law and Order Act. [TLOA] is based on the premise that tribal 
nations with sufficient resources and authority will be best able to 
address violence in their own communities . . . .”88 The exercise of 
jurisdiction costs money. It’s notable that all three Pilot Project 
tribes operate casino resorts, and thus have access to financial 
resources that many other tribes lack, which facilitated their ability 
to fund the exercise of VAWA’s SDVCJ.89  
How would a criminal defendant raise the issue that the 
presiding tribal court judge is unqualified? Most complaints about 
the qualifications and skill of a judge in state courts are handled 
through the disciplinary or political processes. An unhappy litigant 
may appeal a ruling but the arguments made on appeal are that the 
judge either misinterpreted or misapplied the law. The complaints 
are not directed personally to the judge’s qualifications to preside 
over the trial itself. How would a criminal defendant in tribal court 
raise the issue of the tribal judge’s lack of qualifications, 
particularly the lack of sufficient training? A common way to 
remove a judge is to move for the judge’s removal on 
disqualification grounds. Canon 2 of the American Bar 
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Rule”) 
states that, “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, 
impartially, competently, and diligently.” 90  Model Rule 2.5(A) 
reiterates, “[a] judge shall perform judicial and administrative 
duties, competently and diligently.” 91  Model Rule 2.11 which 
relates to “disqualification” provides, in relevant part: “A judge 
shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”92 If the 
judge does not recuse himself or herself on his or her own, one of 
the parties may file a motion to disqualify the judge and have the 
                                                                                                             
88 SEN. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012). 
89 Gaming Compacts, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OIG/Compacts/index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
90 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2011). 
91 Id. at 2.5(A) (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 2.11. 
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motion and/or the case transferred to a disinterested judge.93 The 
disqualification provisions of Model Rule 2.11 focus on challenges 
to the judge’s impartiality. Although the Model Rules require a 
judge to perform competently, they do not seem to contemplate 
motions to disqualify based on incompetence, lack of training, or 
lack of experience. Nonetheless, a motion to recuse is one way in 
which a defendant may challenge the tribal court judge’s 
qualifications to hear the case.94  
Another possible way to challenge a presiding tribal court 
judge’s qualifications in a criminal case is by a motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 95  Under 25 U.S.C. § 
1302(b), if the defendant is subject to being imprisoned for a total 
term of more than one year, the tribe is required to utilize a 
licensed judge with sufficient training to preside over criminal 
proceedings.96 In such a case, a defendant may argue that the judge 
lacked sufficient training, and, therefore, a key element of subject-
matter jurisdiction was lacking. Or, in the alternative, that the 
“unqualified” judge can still hear the case, but simply cannot 
impose a sentence in excess of one year. 
The argument that the lack of a qualified presiding judge 
divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction may be made with 
greater force in cases that fall under ICRA’s provisions governing 
the exercise of SDVCJ. Section 1304(d) states that in a criminal 
proceeding in which a participating tribe exercises special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction, the participating tribe shall 
provide, inter alia, “all applicable rights under the Act”; which 
includes the right to a presiding judge who meets the qualifications 
under 25 U.S.C § 1302(c)(3). Thus it can be argued that a licensed, 
trained tribal court judge is a prerequisite to the exercise of 
SDVCJ. 
                                                                                                             
93 Leslie Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1994). 
94 Cf. Johnson v. Tracy, No. CV-11001979-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 4478801, at 
*3 (D. Ariz Sept. 28, 2012). One of the grounds for the tribal court defendant’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is that he was denied the procedural 
protections of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c). Id. In granting the petition, the federal 
district court did note that the judge at the trial was not licensed to practice law. 
Id. The order does not reveal whether or how the defendant raised the judge’s 
lack of qualifications at the trial level. Id. 
95 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
96 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2010). 
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III. STEPS FOR SATISFYING ICRA’S TRIBAL JUDICIAL 
REQUIREMENTS  
There are number of steps that tribes and tribal courts can take 
to ensure that the judges presiding over criminal proceedings meet 
the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) and 1304(d). First, action 
should be taken by the tribal legislature and the government 
agency with budgeting authority. Tribal code provisions should 
require that the only persons eligible to be a tribal court judge in 
criminal cases governed by TLOA and SDVCJ must be licensed 
and trained. Sufficient federal funding should be provided to the 
tribal court to secure licensed judges and ensure that they receive 
training in criminal law and procedure.97 If a tribe has the means to 
do so, tribal judicial training should be high on the list of priorities 
for allocation of tribal funds. Second, the tribal court itself could 
establish by court rule that only judges who are licensed and 
trained may be assigned to hear TLOA and SDVCJ matters. In a 
manner similar to the Tulalip Tribal Court, a separate court docket 
could be established in which the federally mandated Due Process 
protections are provided. 98  Each presiding judge should have a 
continually updated resume or biographical statement that recites 
the judge’s educational background, licensure, formal criminal 
training (including law school classes and other trainings through 
the National Judicial College or other judicial educational 
organizations), and the number of criminal trials and/or appeals 
adjudicated. 
                                                                                                             
97 In 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno stated in testimony before the Senate 
Indian Affairs Committee, that it is “crucial” to provide additional funding to 
“better enable Indian tribal courts, historically under-funded and under-staffed, 
to meet the demands of burgeoning case loads.” Attorney General Reno 
acknowledged that, “With adequate resources and training, [tribal courts] are 
most capable of crime prevention and peacekeeping.” It is her view that 
“fulfilling the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian nations means 
not only adequate federal law enforcement in Indian Country, but enhancement 
of tribal justice systems as well.” See Department of Justice/Department of the 
Interior Tribal Justice Initiatives: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 105th Cong. 55 (1998) (statement of Janet Reno, Att‘y Gen. of the 
United States).  
98 TULALIP TRIBAL CODES § 4.25.040 (2015), 
http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/Tulalip/?Tulalip04/Tulalip0425.html#4.25.0
40. 
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Third, procedures should be put in place so that the trial record 
reflects the defendant’s right to have the case heard by a licensed 
and trained judge. The advisement of rights at arraignment should 
articulate both orally and in writing the due process protections 
required by TLOA and VAWA. As part of the advisement, the 
presiding judge should recite his or her qualifications. 99  The 
defendant should also be provided with a copy of the judge’s 
resume or biographical paragraph. If feasible, the tribal prosecutor 
should try to reach a stipulation with defense counsel that the 
presiding judge is licensed and qualified. Bench rulings and written 
judgments of conviction should include a finding that reiterates 
that the presiding judge is licensed and sufficiently trained in the 
conduct of criminal proceedings. 
Although Congress declined to require that tribal court judges 
exercising the expanded jurisdiction under TLOA and VAWA 
2013 be law school graduates, it did express the understanding that 
“tribal court judges presiding over the case must be licensed and 
law trained.”100  In 1968, ICRA were enacted because the U.S. 
Constitution does not govern tribes, and thus neither tribes nor 
tribal justice systems are required to follow the Bill of Rights.101 
Ironically, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 is titled “Constitutional Rights of 
Indians.” After the amendments effectuated by TLOA and VAWA 
2013, ICRA now includes language that tribes must provide 
criminal defendants with protections “equal to that guaranteed by 
the United States Constitution” 102  and “all other rights whose 
protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United 
States.”103 Consequently, the conclusion can be drawn that tribal 
judges presiding over matters governed by TLOA and VAWA 
                                                                                                             
99 In many tribal cultures humility is an aspirational virtue. A judicial recitation 
of accomplishments may be perceived as bragging and might be uncomfortable. 
100 S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 24 (2009) (emphasis added).  
101 See Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns 
preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as 
unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as 
limitations on federal or state authority . . . this Court [has] held that the Fifth 
Amendment d[oes] not ‘operat[e] upon’ ‘the powers of local self-government 
enjoyed’ by the tribes. In ensuing years, the lower federal courts have extended 
the holding of Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
102 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1) (2010). 
103 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2010). 
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2013 must be trained in the Due Process protections as conferred 
under the U.S. Constitution and construed in case law.  
There are almost no formal qualifications for federal judges.104 
The U.S. Constitution does not even mandate that Justices of the 
Supreme Court be law school graduates.105 Nonetheless, there is an 
informal requirement that both federal and state judges be law 
school graduates. 106  Federal judges who are hearing habeas 
petitions from tribal court detention orders will be looking through 
the lens of a law school graduate and may conclude that a tribal 
judge who has not attended an ABA accredited law school is not 
“sufficiently trained.” Does this mean that all state and federal 
judges who are law school graduates are fully equipped by their 
educations to preside over criminal proceedings? The American 
Bar Association’s Revised Standards for Accreditation of Law 
Schools (“Standards”) does not require accredited law schools to 
follow a particular curriculum. 107  Rather the Standards provide 
general direction including what the objectives of a program of 
legal education must be: “A law school shall maintain a rigorous 
program of legal education that prepares its students, upon 
graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective, ethical, and 
                                                                                                             
104 Magistrate and bankruptcy judges are required by statute to be lawyers, but 
there is no such requirement for district judges, circuit judges, or Supreme Court 
justices. 28 U.S.C. § 361(b)(1) provides that, “[n]o individual may be appointed 
or reappointed to serve as a magistrate judge under this chapter unless: (1) He 
has been for at least five years a member in good standing of the bar of the 
highest court of a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, the Territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, or the Virgin Islands of the United States, except that an individual who 
does not meet the bar membership requirements of this paragraph may be 
appointed and serve as a part-time magistrate judge if the appointing court or 
courts and the conference find that no qualified individual who is a member of 
the bar is available to serve at a specific location.” 
105 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (sole constitutional requirement for federal judges and 
justices to hold office is “good Behaviour”).  
106 Only forty-seven (47) of 112 U.S. Supreme Court Justices have had no 
formal law school training. See, HENRY JULIAN ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, 
PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 49 (5th ed. 2007). 
107 Revised Standards for Approval of Law Schools, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. 
AND ADMISSIONS (August 2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_an
d_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/201406_revised_stan
dards_clean_copy.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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responsible participation as members of the legal profession.”108 
Most law schools, however, have their own mandatory curriculum 
for the first year. An ABA study of law school curricula 
documented that 86.9 percent of accredited law schools required 
full-time students to take a course in Criminal Law in their first 
year. 109  Only 11 percent required first year students to take a 
Criminal Procedure course.110 
In state and federal systems, many judges hearing criminal 
cases may have only had one formal criminal law course. Despite 
this lack of formal training, experienced criminal law attorneys are 
frequently appointed to the bench. It would be advisable that non-
law school graduate tribal court judges designated to preside in 
criminal proceedings governed by 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) and/or § 
1304 undergo criminal law training equivalent to at least what a 
first year law student receives. It is important, however, for the 
tribal judge to also keep a record of his or her criminal law 
experience as an advocate, attorney, or judge. This on-the-job 
training can be used to support a finding that the presiding judge 
has sufficient legal training. Given that under SDVCJ, tribal judges 
will be hearing prosecutions involving allegations that the 
defendant committed domestic violence, dating violence, or 
violated a protection order in the tribe’s territory, it is important 
that tribal judges presiding in these cases also receive training in 
the dynamics of this kind of violence, understand perpetrator 
behavior, and how to meet victim/survivor needs.111 It is essential 
                                                                                                             
108 Id. at Standard 301(a). 
109 A Survey of Law School Curricula, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS 25 (2004). 
110 Id. at 27. 
111 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(2) (2010) (Domestic Violence): 
 
[M]eans violence committed by a current or former spouse or 
intimate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the 
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is 
cohabitating with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse 
or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to a 
spouse of the victim under the domestic or family violence 
laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the Indian 
country where the violence occurs. 
 
25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (2010) (Dating Violence): 
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that tribal judges be given the tools to comply with Anglo notions 
of due process while also meeting their own tribal criminal justice 
goals (e.g., offender accountability, restorative justice, etc.). 
Unfortunately, outside of the law school setting there are few 
opportunities for non-attorney judges to access criminal law and 
procedure training. A review of the courses offered by the National 
Judicial College for 2015 reveals that there are a few that may 
provide, in part at least, some of the training that a reviewing 
federal judge would find sufficient: Essential Skills for Tribal 
Court Judges; Advanced Tribal Bench Skills: Competence, 
Confidence, and Control; Special Court Jurisdiction; and 
Advanced Special Court Jurisdiction. 112  The Special Court 
Jurisdiction courses are not tribal court specific, but tribal judges 
may attend. Another course, “ICRA: Protecting Rights in Tribal 
Court” was offered in 2014 but was not offered in 2015. Each of 
these courses costs between $995 (and conference fee of $245) for 
                                                                                                             
[M]eans violence committed by a person who is or has been in 
a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the 
victim, as determined by the length of the relationship, the 
type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction between 
the persons involved in the relationship. 
 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1304(5) (2010) (Protection Order): 
 
(A) means any injunction, restraining order or other order 
issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of 
preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, 
sexual violence against, contact or communication with, or 
physical proximity to, another person; and  
(B) includes any temporary or final order issued by a civil or 
criminal court, whether obtained by filing an independent 
action or as a pendent lite order in another proceeding, if the 
civil or criminal order was issued in response to a complaint, 
petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking 
protection. 
 
112 Courses, NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, 2015, 
http://www.judges.org/courses/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). However the 
Special Court Jurisdiction description states that “[t]his course is specifically 
designed for judges without law degrees who are recently appointed or elected 
special court judges. Judges will learn the basics of their judicial role, including 
small claims, traffic court, and misdemeanors.” Special Court Jurisdiction, 
NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE, http://www.judges.org/special-court-jurisdiction-
1607/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015) (emphasis added). Tribal judges charged with 
exercising jurisdiction under TLOA, however, will also be handling felony 
cases. 
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a three day training and $1,595 (plus a conference fee of $495).113 
Some scholarships are made available but the vast majority of 
tribal judges must pay these fees out of pocket, plus the cost of 
their travel to Reno, Nevada, lodging, and meals.114 There does not 
appear to be one single course or a series of courses that can assure 
that the tribal judge participant will be “sufficiently trained” to 
handle TLOA and VAWA criminal cases. Given the fact that 
VAWA 2013’s tribal jurisdictional provisions became effective for 
all tribes in March 2015, it is urgent that training be developed to 
meet this need without delay. It is imperative that tribal judges who 
are familiar with U.S. Constitution-based Due Process protections 
and the need to adhere to tribal values, such as restorative justice 
principles, traditions, and customs deliver the training. Ideally 
there should be a certificate that a tribal court judge can earn that 
will provide prima facie evidence of “sufficient legal training” to 
preside over criminal matters governed by 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c) 
and 1304. Having retired federal judges provide advice on the 
development of the course curriculum may bolster acceptance of 
the certificate by the federal courts. The training should be 
available year-round, not just offered on an ad hoc basis. Online 
courses and webinars, available to even the most remote tribes 
should be created. Given the practical outlook of many American 
Indians and Alaska Natives, it is also important to incorporate 
experiential learning methods. Santa Clara Pueblo member 
Professor Gregory A. Cajeta observed that “many Indians have less 
difficulty comprehending educational materials and approaches 
that are concrete or experiential rather than abstract and theoretical. 
Given this characteristic, learning and teaching should begin with 
numerous concrete examples and activities to be followed by 
discussion of the abstraction.” 115  Finally, ongoing continuing 
judicial education should be developed and readily available to 
keep tribal court judges current.  
Now that the need for judicial education has been established, 
the question arises: How will tribes pay for training? As discussed 
                                                                                                             
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Gregory A. Cajete, The Native American Learner and Bicultural Science 
Education, in NEXT STEPS: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE TO ADVANCE INDIAN 
EDUCATION 135, 142 (Karen Gayton Swisher & John Tippeconnic eds., 1999). 
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earlier, tribal courts are and have been historically underfunded. 
Most tribal courts are supported with a combination of sources: 
Bureau of Indian Affairs funding, grants from the Department of 
Justice or other government agency, and tribal funds. The Bureau 
of Indian Affairs Tribal Justice Support Directorate describes its 
mission as follows:  
 
Tribal Justice Support provides funding guidance, 
technical support, and advisory services to tribal 
courts and the Courts of Indian Offenses. This 
includes providing funding to tribal courts, training 
directed to specific needs of tribal court personnel, 
promoting cooperation and coordination among 
tribal justice systems and Federal and state judiciary 
systems, and providing oversight for the continuing 
operations for the Courts of Indian Offenses.116  
 
The Office of Tribal Justice Support did offer some trial advocacy 
training in 2013 and 2014, but no future planned trainings are 
listed on their website. 117  TLOA established the Indian Law 
Enforcement Foundation (“Foundation”) whose duties include: 
‘‘assist[ing] the Office of Justice Services of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs and Indian tribal governments in funding and conducting 
activities and providing education to advance and support the 
provision of public safety and justice services in American Indian 
and Alaska Native communities.”118 The Secretary of the Interior 
should have established the Foundation no later than January 20, 
2011, however, to this date, there is no evidence that the 
Foundation exists.119 
Under the U.S. Department of Justice Coordinated Tribal 
Assistance Solicitation (CTAS), federally recognized tribes and 
tribal consortia may apply for funding to improve public safety and 
victim services in tribal communities.120 Applications may be filed 
                                                                                                             
116 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE SERVICES, TRIBAL JUSTICE 
SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xojs/documents/text/idc-
041108.pdf. 
117 Id. 
118 25 U.S.C. § 458ccc-1(d)(2) (2010). 
119 Id. (a)(1). 
120 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 1121-0329, COORDINATED TRIBAL 
ASSISTANCE SOLICITATION: FISCAL YEAR 2015 COMPETITIVE GRANT 
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under five different Purpose Areas. 121  Under Purpose Area 3, 
Justice Systems and Alcohol and Substance Abuse, and Purpose 
Area 5, Violence Against Women Tribal Governments Program, a 
tribe may use funding “[t]o implement enhanced authorities and 
provisions under the Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.”122 It appears that 
training a tribal judge to preside over criminal proceedings would 
fall under this provision. However, tribal judicial education 
providers are not eligible to receive this funding directly to develop 
and deliver the training. 
The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Violence Against 
Women Grants to Support Families in the Justice System program 
(“Justice for Families Program”) was authorized by VAWA 
2013. 123  The intent of the Justice for Families Program is to 
improve the response of all aspects of the civil and criminal justice 
system to families with a history of domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault, and stalking, or cases of child sexual 
abuse allegations. 124  Among the eligible applicants are Indian 
tribal governments, tribal courts and non-profit organizations 
providing tribal judicial education. Under Purpose Area 3 
“Training for court-based and court-related personnel” funding is 
available to:  
 
Educate court-based and court-related personnel 
and court-appointed personnel (including custody 
evaluators and guardians ad litem) and child 
protective services workers on the dynamics of 
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, 
and stalking, including information on perpetrator 
behavior, evidence-based risk factors for domestic 
                                                                                                             
ANNOUNCEMENT (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/pages/attachments/2014/11/19/ct
as_fy-2015_solicitation.pdf. The application deadline was February 24, 2015. 
121 Id. at i. 
122 Id. at 19, 23. 
123 OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO. 
1122-0020, OVW FISCAL YEAR 2015 JUSTICE FOR FAMILIES PROGRAM 
SOLICITATION 5 (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/pages/attachments/2014/12/31/fy-
2015-justice-for-families-solicitation.pdf. Deadline application was February 14, 
2015. 
124 Id. 
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and dating violence homicide, and on issues relating 
to the needs of victims, including safety, security, 
privacy, and confidentiality, including cases in 
which the victim proceeds pro se.125 
 
The Justice for Families Program funds can be used to develop and 
deliver training to tribal court judges that will improve their 
competence in handling SDVCJ cases beyond merely developing 
an understanding of criminal law and procedure. 
Section 402 of TLOA reauthorized the Tribal Justice Act, and 
Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 
2001.126 These Acts authorize funding for tribal court judges, court 
personnel, public defenders, court facilities, and the development 
of records managements systems and other needs of tribal court 
systems.127 The Tribal Justice Act, originally enacted December 
1993, authorized the appropriation of $58.4 million in tribal court 
base funding.128 Yet, not a single dollar under the Tribal Justice 
Act has been appropriated in the twenty-two years since its 
passage.129 Of particular note is the provision of the Tribal Justice 
Act that states that federal funds may be used specifically for 
“training programs and continuing education for tribal judicial 
personnel.” 130  The reauthorization of these Acts, which could 
provide much-needed funds to support tribal court base operations 
and enhancements, are set to expire in 2015. Appropriations should 
finally be made to fulfill the promise of these Acts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Tribes fought hard for the passage of TLOA and Title IX of 
VAWA. Not all tribes may choose to avail themselves of the 
enhanced sentencing authority or SDVCJ. Many tribes believe that 
the imposition of federal standards of Due Process infringes on 
tribal sovereignty and self-determination. There is resistance to 
                                                                                                             
125 Id. at 6. 
126 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258, § 
242 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
127 Id. 
128 Tribal Justice Act: Hearing on P.L.103-176 Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995). 
129 Shapiro, supra note 15. 
130 25 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(3). 
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being told who may and may not serve as a tribal judge in criminal 
proceedings. However, the judicial qualification provisions were 
one of the compromises that were reached in order for tribal 
jurisdiction to be restored. Other tribes may not implement TLOA 
or SDVCJ because they lack the funding to hire licensed judges or 
to train their existing judges. Congress adopted a flexible standard 
when it came to the licensure of tribal court judges. This standard 
accommodates a tribe’s culturally responsive decision to authorize 
non-law school graduates to serve as tribal court judges. The 
requirement that a tribal court judge have “sufficient legal training 
to preside over criminal proceedings” is less straightforward. 
Realizing that tribal court convictions will be increasingly subject 
to federal court review through habeas corpus proceedings, tribes 
should endeavor to develop judicial standards and training that will 
pass muster with a federal judge. Hopefully, it will be the tribal 
court judges themselves who take the lead to develop and provide 
the training that comports with federal expectations—while still 
ensuring fidelity to indigenous tribal justice beliefs and practices. 
